The European Court of Justice Ruling in Brüstle v. Greenpeace: The Impacts on Patenting of Human Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells in Europe

Abstract

Though not directly addressed in the CJEU judgment, the question whether or not human iPSCs fall under the definition of human embryos will presumably be the subject of another reference for a preliminary ruling in future patent law case. But, as we have argued elsewhere, the mere potential of pluripotent stem cell types is not a sufficient reason to exclude them from patent protection (Vrtovec and Vrtovec, 2007xVrtovec, K.T. and Vrtovec, B. Stem Cells. 2007; 25: 3026–3028Crossref | PubMed | Scopus (4)See all ReferencesVrtovec and Vrtovec, 2007).However, it is becoming evident that the CJEU is extending the definition of human dignity to entities that in no way resemble fertilized human embryos awaiting potential implantation into a female uterus via in vitro fertilization. SCNT bypassed the need for sperm cells, and direct reprogramming avoided the need for ova. What we have been left as a starting material are the trillions of somatic cells found in every individual. Now, even these cells are caught by an overbroad and ill-conceived ruling.If the CJEU continues with its definition of human embryos, and regenerative medicine outside Europe produces more successful results, rebalancing existing equilibrium between promises and perils of stem cell research seems inevitable. Human dignity is a noble concept, but it is as useful insofar as it is concerned with the well-being of actual human beings. Europe should focus more on protecting the human dignity of terminally ill patients eagerly awaiting novel stem cell treatments than on safeguarding the human dignity of each and every somatic cell in our body.