The European Commission’s environmental stakeholder consultations: Is lobbying success based on what you know, what you own or who you know?

Abstract

Is the political system of the European Union (EU), and the European Commission (EC) consultations in particular, systematically biased in favour of some interests over others? In the course of the EC’s stakeholder consultations, firms, interest groups and other stakeholders make competing policy recommendations. The EC rejects many such recommendations but adopt others in its policy proposals that initiate and steer the legislative procedures of the EU, creating winners and losers among stakeholders and prompting the question: What determines whether a policy recommendation from stakeholders will be adopted by the European Commission? Relying on a new data set of over 8000 policy recommendations from 693 stakeholders, with more specific measures of expertise and privileged access than previously available, this article evaluates whether the EC listens to stakeholders because of what they know, what they own or who they know. The article also presents a method that takes counter-lobbying into account statistically. Results indicate that lobbying success in the EC’s environmental stakeholder consultations is based in part on what stakeholders know, but the consultations also significantly favour wealthy business interests.