The European Banking Authority in Light of the CJEU Jurisprudence: The Case of Innovative Payment Services

Abstract

The activity of the European Banking Authority (EBA), often implying not only technical, but also political, economic and social evaluations, is hardly compatible with the traditional agency model based on a depoliticized activity. The evolvement of the EBA, and of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in general, demands profound scholarly attention, including a critical analysis of recent CJEU jurisprudence. In light of such jurisprudence, which is taking distance from the Meroni case (a key authority on the limitations imposed on the ESAs rule-making), this article aims at rethinking EU agencies’ position within the EU executive, with particular reference to the activity of the EBA in payment systems. To this scope, this article explores the role and activity of EBA in contributing to create the EU Single Rulebook through its drafting of the relevant Regulatory Technical Standards (RTSs), such as the ones on strong customer authentication and on secure communication.