The Eurasian Idea and Leo Gumilëv’s Scientific Ideology

Abstract

In the days when Marxism-Leninism cherished a privileged position in the Soviet Union, the only ideology which could challenge-to the small extent that it did-the ideological monopoly of the Communist party, was nationalism. It appeared in two forms. The first, and most popular one, was pochvennichestvo, focusing in its legal manifestations on protection of Orthodox temples endangered with destruction and on idealization of the rustic life-style. The other one was the Fascist-oriented, anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist movement, which was partly anti-Communist and partly co-operating with the Communist party (or even operating within its framework) in organizing anti-Jewish campaigns.1 After the collapse of the Soviet state it turned out that Russia's ideological palette was much more colourful than one would have expected. Still, despite a formal victory of the democrats in the race for power, sundry variations of nationalism took the top positions. The unprecedented freedom of speech that Russia enjoyed in the last decade, disclosed quite wide differentiation within the nationalist orientation as well. Even among the Fascists, one can distinguish at least two options-the purely one, and the German-style one. Yet, in the latter case, too, the swastika is often accompanied by the Orthodox cross.2 Of course, the most Russian nationalism is the one with a religious, Orthodox tinge. It enjoys particularly strong organizational support from a fraction of the church hierarchy.3 Also, it has the deepest historical roots (just to mention the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome) and a very significant intellectual base, especially in the fields of philosophy and theology.4 Another movement reckoned among nationalist movements is Eurasianism.5 That ideology, completely silenced and forbidden under Communism, is currently experiencing a revival, mainly due to Leo Gumilev, a scholar, Aleksandr Dugin, a political writer6 and Nursultan Nazarbaev, a politician and president of Kazakhstan. It is becoming both a cultural and a political factor which may play a significant part in the construction of a new state structure. It seems predestined to play that role not only because of what it shares with other variations of nationalism, but, above all, because of what makes it different from them. And the differences are so important that they make the Eurasian ideology a quite untypical form of nationalism. The most important difference for Eurasianism is that it goes beyond the Russian, or, at best, the Slav ethnic horizon, typical for former nationalism. It seems, however, that some ambiguity7 in the doctrine (as to whether it is a nationalist one), together with the broad range of intellectual interests of its creators, may be the strength of Eurasianism rather than its weakness. Thanks to those characteristics it may become a mutual ideological banner for many a political movement of right-wing orientation. The Eurasian idea has its predecessors mainly among the Slavophiles and Pan-Slavs. Eurasians took from them their resentful attitude towards the West, their violent resentment of Catholicism, their idealization of ancient Russia, and their conviction of the unique character of culture and fate. But, in spite of all the similarities, it is impossible to call them just late Slavophiles, because they differed from their predecessors in what was the most important thing-their attitude towards the Slav nature and, more broadly, their interpretation of history. The creators of Eurasianism did not think that the people were a Slav people in the first place, as the roots of modem Russia are in the time of dramatic contacts with Mongolian nomads and in their influences rather than in the Kievan period. Like the Slavophiles, they talked much about the uniqueness of the path, but they sought justification of that old thesis in the Mongolian roots of the state and culture. …