The EU Blue Card: Preferences, policies, and negotiations between Member States

Abstract

In May 2009, the European Union (EU) approved the ‘Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment’ (the Blue Card Directive). This Directive sought to make the EU internationally more competitive, but Member States were reluctant to cede responsibility for labour market access regulation. Building on liberal intergovernmentalism and a two-level game framework, the article argues that since different national high-skilled immigration policies (demonstrated through a constructed index on States’ openness to high-skilled immigration) have been transferred to EU level, they have created variations in Member States’ positions on the Blue Card in a two-level game. This divergence among Member States helps to explain the less ambitious outcome of the Blue Card Directive, despite general support by Member States on the establishment of common rules for high-skilled immigrants. The final version does not make much of a difference since it is mainly an advertising tool. Through an empirical example of the Blue Card case study, the article helps to better understand how important national preferences remain for European policies.