The Ethics of Privatization

Abstract

Insofar as arguments for privatization can be read as appealing to general ethical conceptions, they acquire greater depth and, perhaps, respectability. The argument from productivity suggests a rule-form of preference utilitarianism: by changing institutions (in this case, by substituting private property rights for collective management of public lands), we’ll promote people’s welfare by enabling them better to satisfy their desires. But we can also glimpse in the recommended institution of private property rights a more Kantian commitment: where I can acquire what’s yours only with your willing consent (and generally in exchange for something of mine you value more), I can’t treat you simply as a means, at least in certain respects. However, in my view, such appeals do little to advance the argument for privatization; on the contrary, they reveal weaknesses in it. The property rights recommended by privatization advocates provide for individual freedom but not for its wise use. They do not help people to treat humanity in their own persons as an end or to form desires worth satisfying. There is an opening here for arguing that privatization is a bad idea, not because the current system, despite appearances, is relatively efficient or the cost of dismantling it is too great, but because what we’d get is inferior in a more basic sense to what we now have. Public land management promises greater protection of our natural and cultural heritage than the market—at least if we can resist the seductive suggestion that it be marketized, i.e., that we aim to allocate the resources of public lands as would an ideal market. Furthermore, the opportunity to define and defend values in public debate rather than simply buying what we happen to prefer (and can afford) is one we should, in our own interests, preserve. It is primarily on such grounds that I oppose privatizing public lands. To get this argument off the ground, we must allow that what I’m interested in can differ from what’s in my interest. I shall spend much of this chapter meeting objections to such a distinction and arguing that the free market can’t be expected to help people take an interest in what’s in their interest.