The Ethics of Memory Blunting: Some Initial Thoughts

Erik Parens

doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2010.00190

Abstract

The Ethics of Memory Blunting: Some Initial Thoughts

Highlights

The ability to interrupt memory reconsolidation and thereby blunt the intensity of emotions associated with painful memories raises the ethical question, Should there to be a limit on efforts to manipulate our memories? (Debiec and Altemus, 2006)
Insofar as having a human self requires having memories, and insofar as erasing all of them would be tantamount to annihilating one’s self (Wasserman, 2004; Levy, 2007), we can glimpse a first point of easy agreement
If we picture memory erasure as being on the left end of a continuum, which stretches from highly undesirable forms of memory manipulation on the left to highly desirable forms on the right, just a bit to the right of memory erasure would be some forms of memory blunting that many could readily agree would be undesirable

Summary

Introduction

The ability to interrupt memory reconsolidation and thereby blunt the intensity of emotions associated with painful memories raises the ethical question, Should there to be a limit on efforts to manipulate our memories? (Debiec and Altemus, 2006). We in the West have long contemplated what it would mean, not just to blunt the emotional intensity of some memories, but to erase them altogether.

Results

Conclusion