Abstract
In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anx- iety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delu- sions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1) acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2) establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.
Highlights
In ‘‘The Ethics of Belief’’, Clifford defends the view that there are norms governing beliefs, and argues that one such norm is that beliefs should be formed on the basis of sufficient evidence (Clifford 2001)
In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions
When agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring
Summary
In ‘‘The Ethics of Belief’’, Clifford defends the view that there are norms governing beliefs (doxastic norms), and argues that one such norm is that beliefs should be formed on the basis of sufficient evidence (Clifford 2001). If an epistemic deontologist were committed to the view that a belief is justified when the person adopting that belief fulfilled her basic doxastic duties, Craig’s belief in creationism would be justified if his evidence against creationism was limited and unconvincing or discredited by sources he had reasons to trust. Both claims about epistemic justification seem unattractive, but there are other lessons that can be learned by exploring the case of Alice and that of Craig that are relevant to the ethics of adopting beliefs. In considering the potential implications of our view, we rely on an analogy with the legal notion of innocence defence to describe delusions as being epistemically nonwrongful, and agents with delusions as epistemically innocent
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
