Abstract
This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance. These are ontological and ethical questions, respectively. As the title indicates, I address both from a broadly neo-Aristotelian perspective, i.e. a teleological philosophy of life and virtue ethics. For brevity’s sake, I shall not argue for either philosophical position at length, but instead hope to demonstrate their legitimacy through their explanatory power. I firstly argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms. I then suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterised by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life.
Highlights
This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance
The present analysis of synthetic biology will begin with the ontological question of what kind of beings synthetic organisms are, arriving at an answer by drawing comparisons with machines, natural organisms ( ‘organisms’), and genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
Rejecting the dominant mechanistic paradigm in the philosophy of biology, I have attempted to show that immanent teleology distinguishes living beings from machines and other artefacts
Summary
Broadly speaking, to create novel organisms using standardised biological parts and in accordance with engineering principles. It is anything but: do biologists and philosophers of science frequently describe organisms in mechanistic terms for heuristic purposes (which we might excuse), but many go further and suggest that organisms are a kind of machine [1] This ontological claim is, I believe, wholly erroneous and serves to undermine ethical analysis concerning both human and non-human life. Contemporary biologists and philosophers who regard organisms as machines follow suit— the only difference being that the industrial metaphors of pumps and pistons once used to describe them have been replaced by computational ones of hardwiring and programming This mechanistic conception is lent credence by those who argue that understanding the world in terms borrowed from contemporary technologies is acceptable, but inescapable—a claim that needs to be briefly addressed. Merits and its neo-Aristotelian character, I will refer to Jonas’ work throughout the remainder of the essay.
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