The Ethical Importance of Being Human

Abstract

positioning of ethics as first philosophy, prior to ontology or epistemology, can appear to contradict Levinas's insistence that other be another person, i.e., human. After all, if ethical relation is that precedes or knowing, then on what basis might claim that such a relation can exist only among or in a particular instantiation of beings, namely human beings? Scholars interested in environmental ethics and human-animal relations have grappled with this issue in Levinas's philosophy, but usually as a critical move that would contradict or correct Levinas (e.g., Benso, Clark, Diehm). This is of little surprise given that Levinas's moral universe is both resolutely and exclusively human, leaving little space for ethical relation to nonhuman as more than merely derivative of interhuman relations. This is to say that cannot attempt to recuperate an environmental ethic or an ethic that might extend to relations with nonhuman others from Levinas. Indeed, Levinas himself will claim implications for relations with nonhumans from his philosophy of ethics, but such implications are, for him, always secondary reflections of more primary relation between humans. focus of this essay is neither whether Levinas's philosophy is right or wrong about its obsession with what is uniquely human, nor whether philosophy ought more properly to take into account a primary ethical relationship with nonhuman others. This is neither an environmentalist nor vegetarian ethical treatise. Instead, I am concerned with simple question: How does Levinas justify or substantiate unique ethical status of human without returning to ontology? My hypothesis regarding this question is that Levinas's distinct notion of God and his insistence upon unique status of human are glue that holds together his ethical philosophy. culmination of Levinas's thought, from this vantage point, is merely his statements on ethics and justice, but also his unique refiguring of humanism. In order to explore these issues, this essay begins with a brief clarification of Levinas's statements about relations to nonhumans then works through this distinction to clarify concept of face and God in Levinas's thought. Finally, I conclude with an exegesis of Levinas's unique position vis-a-vis humanism. Non-Human Others Silvia Benso, David Clark, and Christian Diehm have each taken significant notice of Levinas's insistence on a fundamentally different ethical category for human and nonhuman. Levinas himself has made this point on a number of occasions, though entirely without equivocation. Part of controversy comes from his short description of experience of a stray dog wandering into prisoner of war camp where Levinas was held (Difficult Freedom 152-53) and his subsequent discussions of status of face of a dog and a snake of Morality 16973). While Levinas does admit that the ethical extends to all living being and that one cannot entirely refuse face of an animal, he is always quick to follow up these statements with amendments that priority or prototype for any ethical consideration of nonhuman must always first be human ethics (Paradox 169,172). When asked directly about matter, Levinas put it thus: The human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover face of an animal (Paradox 172). It was for this reason that Levinas criticized philosophy of Martin Buber not because he seems to be animistic in his relation to nature; it is rather that he seems too much artiste in his relation to people (Proper 33). issue is whether we bear some ethical responsibility for nonhuman; Levinas easily concludes that we do. issue is whether such responsibility is itself a direct ethical relation or merely derivative of a more unique ethical relation of interhuman. …