Abstract
Supreme Court efforts to protect religious freedom by guarding the “wall of separation” between church and state have been plagued with divisive 5–4 decisions and plurality opinions. We suggest that part of the problem in consistently adjudicating Establishment Clause cases arises because of the Court's weak efforts to define religious communication. The Justices tacitly define religious communication by relying on conventional symbols traditionally associated with religions institutions. Drawing from theorists of metaphor, C. S. Lewis, Janet Soskice and Earl MacCormac, we propose an alternative model of religious communication that is more sensitive to the plurality of nontraditional and traditional religions now represented in America.
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