Abstract

AbstractThe idea of dignity figures prominently in Frederick Douglass’s philosophy of rights, duties, and virtues. In this essay, I argue that Douglass’s understanding of dignity is best understood as a capacities-based account; he contends that the special moral worth of human beings is rooted in their distinctive capacities to reason, to understand morality, to choose how they will act, and to think of themselves as subjects that exist through time. Douglass relied on this account to argue that human beings have certain rights that ought to be protected, that they have certain duties to others, and that they can demonstrate their dignity by using their capacities in virtuous ways. Douglass’s philosophy of dignity lends support to J. David Greenstone’s suggestion that Douglass is best understood as a reform liberal; he was focused on the cultivation of essential human capacities and the duty to secure the conditions necessary for others to cultivate those capacities.

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