The Essence and Epistemological Significance of the Conceptual Dispute between Fallibilism and Infallibilism

Abstract

For hundreds of years, almost all representatives of philosophical epistemology have assumed that human knowledge should be based on irrefutable, infallible and absolute foundation. Finding such stable epistemological milestones that will serve as the epistemological basis for the formation of infallible knowledge, cognition, and the creation of more fundamental concepts of knowledge—and, as the ultimate goal, cognition and true knowledge—was the dream of many philosophers and epistemologists. The epistemological dispute of fallibilism and infallibilism is highly valuable when viewed through the lens of the presented problem. A decision in favour of either side may lead one to reconsider issues such as the nature and justification of knowledge, the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the possibility of cognition, the nature of truth and its criteria, truth as the end goal of scientific research and cognition, and the issues surrounding the growth and progress of science. These issues are fundamental and guiding issues for the future development of philosophical epistemology and philosophy of science. Despite the fact that various attempts have been made to study the epistemological dispute of opposing concepts, especially since the 19th century, and each of the concepts separately has been the subject of numerous studies throughout the history of philosophy, nevertheless, today there is still no unified understanding of the essence of the epistemological dispute of fallibilism and infallibilism, the main range of problems and questions of the latter, as well as the epistemological meaning of the conceptual dispute. The study and analysis of the essence of an epistemological dispute, the clarification of its epistemological meaning, as well as the identification in the context of the dispute and the framework of epistemological and scientific problems arising from it are considered the central points of this work. To this end , the following tasks and questions were set in the article: 1. What is the essence and epistemological significance of the dispute between fallibilism and infallibilism? 2. What range of problems does an epistemological dispute suggest? 3. What is the significance of the epistemological dispute between fallibilism and infallibilism from the perspective of understanding, rethinking and solving the problems of philosophical epistemology and philosophy of science?