The ergodicity solution of the cooperation puzzle

Abstract

When two entities cooperate by sharing resources, one relinquishes something of value to the other. This apparent altruism is frequently observed in nature. Why? Classical treatments assume circumstances where combining resources creates an immediate benefit, e.g. through complementarity or thresholds. Here we ask whether cooperation is predictable without such circumstances. We study a model in which resources self-multiply with fluctuations, a null model of a range of phenomena from viral spread to financial investment. Two fundamental growth rates exist: the ensemble-average growth rate, achieved by the average resources of a large population; and the time-average growth rate, achieved by individual resources over a long time. As a consequence of non-ergodicity, the latter is lower than the former by a term which depends on fluctuation size. Repeated pooling and sharing of resources reduces the effective size of fluctuations and increases the time-average growth rate, which approaches the ensemble-average growth rate in the many-cooperator limit. Therefore, cooperation is advantageous in our model for the simple reason that those who do it grow faster than those who do not. We offer this as a candidate explanation for observed cooperation in rudimentary environments, and as a behavioural baseline for cooperation more generally.This article is part of the theme issue ‘Emergent phenomena in complex physical and socio-technical systems: from cells to societies’.