The Equilibrium Point Between the Autonomy of Parliament and Other Constitutional Principles, as Viewed Through The Theoretical Framework of a System of Constitutional Justice. Case-Study: Italy

Abstract

Abstract Scholarly debate concerning the judicial review of parliamentary proceedings has mainly focused on the constitutional principles in the light of which such a review should be excluded/grounded/limited. However, the equilibrium point between these principles remains elusive. This essay does not attempt to resolve this issue, since appropriate solutions can differ greatly from one legal order to another. Moreover, this being a matter of balance, a solution cannot be given once and for all, even domestically. Instead, this essay aims to enrich existing studies, suggesting a methodology for viewing (and critically analysing) the equilibrium point in a domestic setting. First, however, supranational/international ‘constitutional’ principles should also be considered. Some examples of case-law (mainly concerning Italy) will be given. Secondly, such a balance should be viewed within the theoretical framework of the specific system of constitutional justice established domestically (i.e. types of standards, acts to be reviewed, jurisdictional disputes, subjects that can initiate disputes, violations of the Constitution). The validity of this second approach is then proved as it relates to Italy.