Abstract
There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.
Highlights
The folk question at the heart of the epistemology of modality is: how can we come to know what is possible? One important project within philosophy is the refinement of folk questions into theoretical questions
Before we can move to a discussion of how the epistemology of essence fits into the epistemology of modality (Sect. 7), we need to first discuss a possible criticism of the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF) that attacks its second part by denying that we have to know the epistemic friction creator (EFC) in the first place
Our investigation of conceivability, counterfactual, and deduction-theory led us to the claim that all three accounts rely on essentialist propositions and/or principles to create epistemic friction in order for them to reliably lead to modal knowledge
Summary
The folk question at the heart of the epistemology of modality is: how can we come to know what is possible? One important project within philosophy is the refinement of folk questions into theoretical questions. We will pursue an exploration of the Hale-Branch, as a way of pushing forward the view that the best approach on the necessity-first side of the debate might turn out to be a variant of Hale’s own essence-based approach. If our argument is successful, we take it that the debate that needs a hearing is one between variants of the Hale-Branch and variants of possibility-first approaches, such as Roca-Royes’ similarity-based approach. This debate would be set against what we think has already had a sound hearing: debates over mental-operation accounts, such as conceivability-theory, counterfactualtheory, or deduction-theory..
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