Abstract

Abstract In this paper, I explore what gives collective testimony its epistemic credentials, through a critical discussion of three competing accounts of the epistemology of collective testimony. According to the first view, collective testimony inherits its epistemic credentials from the beliefs the testimony expresses—where this can be seen either as the beliefs of all or some of the group’s members, or as the beliefs of group itself. The second view denies any necessary connection to belief, claiming instead that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the reliability or truth-conduciveness of the statement that expresses the testimony. Finally, the third view claims that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the fact that it involves undertaking a collective commitment to trustworthiness, which makes the group susceptible to rebuke and blame if its testimony is not trustworthy. I argue that this last account holds the most promise for preserving what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge while still underwriting a robust epistemology of collective testimony.

Highlights

  • We often learn, that is, we acquire knowledge, from groups

  • The third view claims that the epistemic credentials of collective testimony derive from the fact that it involves undertaking a collective commitment to trustworthiness, which makes the group susceptible to rebuke and blame if its testimony is not trustworthy

  • I argue that this last account holds the most promise for preserving what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge while still underwriting a robust epistemology of collective testimony

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Summary

Introduction

There are various kinds of groups whose primary function is to serve as a source of knowledge—think, for example, of the weather bureau, or a commission of inquiry, or a scientific research team. A central way of discharging their epistemic role of disseminating knowledge is by means of testimony: we learn from these groups, when we do, by believing them in what they tell us. How they tell us things may vary, : perhaps the weather bureau maintains a website and a. I shall argue that this last account holds the most promise for preserving what is distinctive about testimonial knowledge while still underwriting a robust epistemology of collective testimony

Testimony and Testimonial Knowledge
Group testimony
Key Desiderata for Epistemological Theories of Collective Testimony
Summativism
Non-summativism
Lackey’s Statement View of Collective Testimony
Fricker’s Trust View of Collective Testimony
Conclusion
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