THE EPISTEMIC STATUS OF THEISTIC BELIEF

Abstract

Until recently, theological discussions of religious epistemology have been notoriously vague, imprecise and confused. Recent work of such thinkers as Alston, Mavrodes, and Plantinga, however, signals a fall from epistemological innocence, and questions about the rationality of belief in God or, more generally, about the status of religious claims to knowledge are again at the forefront of philosophical and theological discussions. The varied theories of truth, justification, and knowledge developed by modern philosophy give renewed pertinence to the perennial question of the rationality of theistic belief. Can belief in God be in accord with the canons of rationality? This paper briefly explores the most compelling contemporary accounts of the epistemic status of theistic belief and considers if any of them has the twin virtues (from the theological perspective) of accurately describing the nature of theistic belief and of allowing the theist to meet our human obligation to rationality.