The Epistemic Imperialism of Science. Reinvigorating Early Critiques of Scientism.

Lucas B Mazur

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.609823

Abstract

Positivism has had a tremendous impact on the development of the social sciences over the past two centuries. It has deeply influenced method and theory, and has seeped deeply into our broader understandings of the nature of the social sciences. Postmodernism has attempted to loosen the grip of positivism on our thinking, and while it has not been without its successes, postmodernism has worked more to deconstruct positivism than to construct something new in its place. Psychologists today perennially wrestle to find and retain their intellectual balance within the methodological, theoretical, and epistemological struggles between positivism and postmodernism. In the process, pre-postmodern criticisms of positivism have been largely forgotten. Although they remain deeply buried at the core of psychology, these early alternatives to positivism are rarely given explicit hearing today. The current piece explores some of the early critiques of positivism, particularly of its scientism, as well as early suggestions to tip the scales (back) in favor of sapientia (“wisdom”). This third option, largely overlooked within mainstream psychology, is of tremendous value today as it is both deconstructive and constructive relative to the shortcomings of positivism. It avoids the overly reductionistic “trivial order” of positivism, as well as the deeply unsatisfying and disorienting “barbaric vagueness” of postmodernism, while simultaneously embracing important core elements of both currents of thought.

Highlights

Psychological science is – for pragmatic considerations – mostly oriented toward positivism, which is perceived as a modern but not postmodern epistemology
These lines from the call for papers are helpful for framing the arguments made in the text below as they point to several important characteristics of contemporary psychology
Postmodernism has highlighted the shortcomings of scientism, and fought tooth and nail against it, but it is unable to move us forward on its own two feet. It is for this reason, as reflected in the call for papers, that psychology remains largely wedded to a modern epistemology that is deeply unsatisfying; we have developed an epistemological Stockholm syndrome, whereby we claim to be fleeing from a philosophy we simultaneously actively profess

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Psychological science is – for pragmatic considerations – mostly oriented toward positivism, which is perceived as a modern but not postmodern epistemology. These lines from the call for papers are helpful for framing the arguments made in the text below as they point to several important characteristics of contemporary psychology It has been long-clear that, while as a methodology positivism is powerful, as a philosophy for the social sciences it is deeply problematic (Sheen, 1934/2019). We examine a handful of pre-postmodern positions based on sapientia that have been buried under the weight of our predominantly positivistic worldview These positions can be reemphasized in a psychology that asserts the wholeness of the human, including the material and quantifiable, and those parts beyond the conceptual reach of the scientific method (Mazur and Watzlawik, 2016; Mazur, 2017). It is to early criticisms of positivism that we turn to

SAPIENTIA AS AN EARLY OBJECTION TO POSITIVISM

The Reinstatement of the Individual

The Notion of Progress

Wonder at the Ordinary

DISCUSSION