The Episodic Sense of Self

Abstract

This is a thick way of conceiving the self, chock full of aspirations, convictions, affections, and affiliations, and it is, of course, a useful way to think about the self. Features of this self-concept predict a person’s general well-being, success in life, social desirability, and a host of other important practical concerns. Philosophers have often been interested in a much thinner conception of self. A thin notion of self is championed by Reid and Butler, who maintain that the traits that one happens to have should be construed as belonging to the self, rather than constituting the self. Kant, on the other hand, maintains that a thin conception of self, the I, is “the poorest of all representations” (Kant 1968, B408), and Kant thinks this conception engenders the illusions of rational psychology—illusions that there is a self that is simple, substantial, and identical across time. It is a matter of some controversy whether Kant should be read as speaking only about the rational psychologists (e.g., Descartes), or whether he thinks that ordinary people have a thin I-concept that leads to a lay illusion of identity across time. Regardless of the exegetical issue, we can explore whether people do in fact have a thin self-concept that is to be sharply distinguished from the trait notion of self. In section 1 of this chapter, I’ll argue that ordinary people exploit both the psychologist’s trait conception and a very thin conception of self, which resonates with philosophical discussions. This thin conception of self is linked, I suggest, with episodic memory. In section 2, I distinguish the sense of identity that is delivered by episodic memory from the biological conception of identity. Section 3 will look at moral OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Wed Apr 23 2014, NEWGEN