The Enterprises’ R&D on High Value Patents Under the Condition of Patents’ Technology Spillover

Abstract

There are a large number of patent applications and authorizations in China, but it is known that the patents’ value is not high, and many of the core patents are mastered by foreign companies. This paper uses the theory of game theory to build the model of different patents’ strategies, containing R companies which refer to enterprises that obtain high-value patents mainly through indepedent R&D and B companies which refer to the enterprises that acquire high value patents through purchasing. Research shows that based on the assumption that market participants are rational people, in order to maximize their own interests, enterprises have a tendency to re-select according to the input of other enterprises. When the gap in the scale of enterprises’ R&D investment expands, the R enterprises depend more on B companies’s R&D output. The degree of patent spillover and the number of two types of enterprises with the same scale are important factors affecting the enterprises’ R&D inputs.