Abstract

Scholars tend to study international organisations as selective clubs. Theorising organisations as clubs, however, obscures an important aspect of their evolution that is connected to the goods they produce. Some organisations produce goods that are increasingly attractive and accessible to non-members. Those organisations face pressures to enlarge beyond the optimal size suggested by club theory, changing the experience of membership fundamentally. Over time, lower exclusivity, increased rivalry, and tighter governance structures shift the organisation from producing club-goods to managing common resource pools. The case of the European Union illustrates this transformation. By theorising the EU as a collection of common resources pools rather than a club, this study underscores how the EU accompanied the pressure for greater inclusiveness and competition for resources with reforms to strengthen member states’ self-discipline and multilateral surveillance. Such institutional reforms were and remain necessary for any international organisation to avoid the tragedy of the commons.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.