The Enhancement of Children versus Circumcision: A Case of Double Moral Standards?

Abstract

The application of enhancement technologies to children and non-medical infant male circumcision are both topics that enjoy the continuous attention of bioethical research but are usually discussed in isolation from each other. Yet one can show that three major arguments used by opponents of the enhancement of children are also applicable to circumcision. These arguments are based on the insecurity of these procedures, the child's right to an open future, and human nature as a foundation of human dignity. People who reject the enhancement of children because of these arguments but accept circumcision hold mutually inconsistent moral convictions or apply double moral standards to these cases. This is particularly important when legislative systems treat the enhancement of children and circumcision in a considerably different manner, which is true for many contemporary legislative systems. At least three strategies can be adopted in order to avoid such inconsistencies, two of which, however, fail for various reasons. According to a third, more promising strategy, circumcision should be subsumed under human enhancement and treated like other enhancement technologies. This strategy justifies restrictions on, but not the prohibition of circumcision. Furthermore, proponents of circumcision should be prepared for future technologies that provide similar benefits as circumcision but are not as contentious as this intervention, so that, in the future, circumcision could become more and more unacceptable.