Abstract
ABSTRACTScholars argue that members of parliament (MPs) in first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems have stronger incentives to cater to their electoral district than those in proportional representation (PR) types. Yet, few studies have explored whether MPs in PR systems or MPs from small parties engage local issues in general. I build new theory and explore its support through a case study that compares Green party behaviour in an FPTP system (the UK) to a PR system (New Zealand). Results show that MPs focus on local issues in both systems, but the distribution of attention varies in ways consistent with differing electoral incentives.
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