The Enduring Constraints on Iran’s Power after the Nuclear Deal

Abstract

DID IRAN EMERGE AS THE WINNER from the nuclear deal it agreed to with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations [UN] Security Council plus Germany) in July 2015? According to critics, the answer is yes: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) lifted restrictions on Iran and allowed it to enhance its position as a dominant player in the Middle East. For example, in a May 2017 visit to Israel, President Donald Trump referred to the JCPOA as a “fantastic” deal for Iran and claimed that it “emboldened” its foreign policy.1 Similarly, former U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) referred to a fast-expanding Iran as being “on the march.”2 Ray Takeyh, a prominent Iran expert, wrote that the Islamic Republic would become a “more aggressive imperial power” after the JCPOA, enabling its “imperial surge.”3 Critics paint the JCPOA as excessively advantageous to Iran because it relaxed many constraints on its power. For Mark Dubowitz, the JCPOA opens the door wide for Iran to reintegrate into the international economy by dismantling “much of the international sanctions architecture.”4 In Israel, then–defense minister Moshe Ya’alon argued that Iran was exploiting the deal “to gain hegemony” in the Middle East.5 Even balanced observers unbound by ideological hostility to the Islamic Republic claimed, as did The Economist in January 2016, that Iran after the JCPOA was “preparing for take-off.”6