Abstract
The increase in the independence of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1989 allows a test of the theoretical implications of the central bank independence literature. Furthermore, the similar inflationary experiences of Australia and Canada provide a rare set of controls. This paper shows that in the short term, the cost of disinflation have not been less in New Zealand than in Australia and that in Canada, where increased credibility was only supported by rhetoric and not legislation, the costs were higher. However, other concurrent reforms in New Zealand may have clouded the picture and the true test may be the path of inflation in the three countries as the economies continue to recover.
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