The End of Globalization? U.S. Antitrust Enforcement After the Global Financial Crisis

Abstract

In the years subsequent to the global financial crisis of 2008, there has been growing skepticism with respect to the unmitigated benefits of globalization. The deterrence effect of antitrust enforcement on foreign investments suggests that increased enforcement would lead to backlashes against globalization, which is also called “de-globalization.” This study examines how antitrust enforcement has changed after the global financial crisis of 2008. I posit that the strictness of antitrust has increased in the post-financial-crisis years, suggesting that antitrust policy in the contemporary cross-national context for global business has partly contributed to the de-globalization. I find U.S. antitrust enforcement is characterized by higher degrees of scrutiny in the years after the global financial crisis (i.e., the age of global skepticism). Specifically, U.S. antitrust generally becomes stricter when (1) economic downturns are manifest in the economy; (2) antitrust officials are unencumbered by a wave of transaction activity; and (3) the Presidency resides with the Democratic Party.