The Empirical I in the System of Ethics

Abstract

Fichte has a reputation outside of Fichte scholarship for individualistic, even solipsistic. Within Fichte scholarship, however, he is well known for importance placed on intersubjectivity as condition for possibility of individual freedom. This emerges in Foundations of Natural Right, with its treatment of relations between individual persons, which makes it seem as though Fichte's priority is individual freedom. Wimin System of Ethics, however, focus is no longer on particular individuals, or even I (der empirische Ich), but rather upon morality itself, and pure I of moral reasoning. Given universalism of his ethics, which, Uke his philosophy in general is Kantian in spirit though not in letter, this is not surprising. Since System of Ethics develops nature of human subjectivity in great detail in order to ground Fichte's moral theory, it also tells us a great deal about how Fichte sees individual human beings within his system - in other words, even though focus is on pure we still learn something about I here. In order to be clear, let me make a brief statement about my terminology. Fichte speaks in various places about determinate individual (das bestimmte Individuum), temporal (das empirische Zeitwesen), self (das empirische Selbst), and entire sensible and empirically determined human being (der ganze sinnliche empirischbestimmte Mensch) (SWTV, 231). For purposes of this essay, I will simply refer to the F or empirical as a way of grouping these together. Primarily this I is to be distinguished from pure and it is this distinction that Fichte thinks is key for ethics, as vocation of human beings is to strive to harmoniously unify two. This essay will consider ways that individuality is dealt with within System of Ethics. Fichte has attracted some attention for his defense of individual freedom in Foundations of Natural Right, but this needs to be placed in conjunction with his treatment of individuaUty in System of Ethics, where whatever is merely particular to individual ought to be transcended. Particularly, I will address question of how to interpret Fichte's statements about I and its relation to pure I in terms of actual human beings. I will consider whether there is an ontological claim made, beyond injunction that we take a universaUst stance in our moral reasoning. If there is such a claim made, how can we make sense of it? If claim is one that we would not want to endorse, could an argument be developed against it on Fichtean grounds? What 'the Empirical Self, for Fichte? Fichte's ethics depends on contrast between empirically determined I and pure unconditioned I of radical freedom. The relationship between them is, in many ways, similar to Aristotelian distinction between form and matter, and between form and particular instantiation ofthat form, which exists as a compound of form and matter. In Aristotelian philosophy, individuation occurs by matter. Individual instances of a form are not individuated except by embodied in particular compounds. It appears that Fichte adheres to this same principle, with determination taking place of matter. We are differentiated by determination, not by what is part of universal human reason. The I is simply human in his or her particularity. Without that determination, there is no person, no self. We can only exist as particular - as empirically determined in various ways: as this person, at this stage in history, with this job, this nationaUty, this gender, this collection of talents, manifest in this particular physical body. As Fichte writes, I, [individual] A, am only insofar as I am A. …