The empirical analysis of the [formula omitted]-bilateral optimized combinatorial auction model

Abstract

This study proposes a new and highly efficient dynamic combinatorial auction mechanism—the N -bilateral optimized combinatorial auction ( N -BOCA). N -BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers more optimized trading for multiple suppliers and purchasers in the supply chain than one-sided combinatorial auction. We design the N -BOCA model from the perspectives of market architecture, trading rules, and decision strategy for winner determination, the decision strategy for winner determination needs flexible optimization modeling capability. Thus rule-based reasoning was applied for reflecting the flexible decision strategies. We also show the viability of N -BOCA through Paired Samples T -test experimentation. It shows that N -BOCA yields higher purchase efficiency and effectiveness than the one-auctioneer to multi-bidders (1-to- N ) combinatorial auction mechanism.