The Empire of the Sea: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN (review)

Abstract

110BOOK REVIEWS Rusk, who was to become Secretary of State under presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Sandusky is clearly unhappy with the way things have turned out. He appears to be critical of the way in which Truman injected considerations of national power into the equation; in fact Sandusky traces the origin of the Cold War to Truman's actions in Korea. In his words, "the thirty-eighth parallel became the first overt move of containment," and the record of U.S. behavior in Korea "reveals a decision-making process prompted by an arrogance ofpower, an impetuous desire to extend the universal relevance of the American way of life to the victims of Japanese imperialism" (p. 333). One must ask, however, what alternative outcome Sandusky would have preferred. Should the United States have taken a hands-off policy and allowed Soviet troops to occupy the entire peninsula? Had that happened, Korea would certainly have remained undivided, and perhaps no civil war might have erupted. Whether that would have been a preferred outcome in terms of either the well-being of the Korean people or the national interests of the United States is open to debate. All in all, this is a fascinating study. Meticulously researched, the book is packed with interesting details and sheds new light on many hitherto obscure aspects of U.S. policy in Korea. It should also serve as a useful bibliographic guide to would-be researchers. If there is a minor problem, it may be that the book provides too many details—considerably more than most readers need or would care to know. But Sandusky cannot be faulted for having done a nearly exhaustive job of examining every significant piece of evidence that bears either directly or tangentially on the origins of the 38th parallel. B. C. Koh University of Illinois at Chicago The Empire of the Sea: A Biography of Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN, by Frederick C. Drake. University of Hawaii Press, 1984. Illustrated, with maps and plates, xv, 483 pp. $29.95. Although Admiral Shufeldt is not a very well-known figure in either the history of the U.S. Navy or the diplomatic history ofthe nation, this is a book that should be of considerable interest to scholars of military affairs, Korea, and the foreign and economic policy of the United States during an interesting historical era. Shufeldt entered the Navy during a period when both sailing and steam-powered ships were in service. During the Civil War he served as commanding officer of ironclad monitors, a ship type made famous by the celebrated battle of the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (formerly the Merrimack). Although he was undoubtedly competent, and his career was marked by promotions and commendations, he was a relatively junior officer during the war, and his name never ranked with the more well-known figures such as Farragut. Shufeldt's career and fame, what little he had, was based more on his diplomatic achievements than his military ones. He was an outspoken advocate of both American seapower and economic imperialism. In this sense he predated the BOOK REVIEWS111 more famous writings of Mahan, who became the most eloquent apologist for colonial empires backed by complete dominance at sea. Shufeldt was one of the first to suggest that the United States build a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. His preferred route was to be the isthmus of Tehuantepec, and his ideas included some sort of economic and colonial influence through which the United States would insure the cooperation of the Mexican government, while still guaranteeing Mexico's independence. During an important period of his naval career, Shufeldt was a seagoing diplomat. He was ordered to make a lengthy cruise on the USS Ticonderoga, a lightly-armed steam vessel, designed more to show the flag than to exercise any degree ofarmed might. Now a Commodore, a suitable rank for impressing officials of foreign countries, he carried out orders drafted jointly by the departments of State and Navy. His instructions, purposely rather vague and general, were to visit ports in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific islands where there were presently no American commercial representatives...