The empire in a comparative global context, 1815–1914

Abstract

[Reprinted from the third edition of Britain's imperial century , for which it was specially written in 2002. Not all libraries will have this edition, and comparative perspectives are increasingly fashionable, so the reprinting seems justified.] Historians have often supposed that the British empire was an unusual case in the history of European expansion and that the expansionist motivation of other states was quite different. But what if it could be shown that in fact these differences have been greatly exaggerated? At first sight, the Russian empire, land-based, with a contiguous metropolis and periphery, might appear to have little in common with the British. The Russian sense of geopolitical vulnerability and strategic insecurity on the open and agriculturally marginal north Eurasian plain has been deep-rooted, and appears to persist even after the collapse of the communist regime. However, the ways in which this worked out in territorial acquisition will be familiar to students of British expansion. In Central Asia from the 1860s the driving force was the search for stable frontiers and sound administration in areas of local political power vacuum and nomadic Muslim raiding. Support might be mobilised by reference to commercial opportunity, particularly the development of the cotton supply, but essentially it was the frontiers of strategic manipulation which were being advanced. Army generals were the directing force.