The Emerging Jurisprudence of Human Dignity

Abstract

Generally speaking, the first four decades of the contemporary international human rights era (1945–1985) were primarily consumed with standard-setting and initial institutional development. The next 15 years (1985–2000) witnessed an explosion in the emergence of international, regional, and national human rights NGOs; an emerging body of human rights jurisprudence; and reinvigorated scholarly activity regarding the nature and scope of human rights in the contemporary era of globalization—exemplified most notably in the “universality-versus-relativism” debate (see Donnelly 2007) and discussions about the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights (for example, International Commission of Jurists 1987; Scott 1989; Dankwa, Flinterman, and Leckie 1998; Leckie 1998; Nickel 2008; and Whelan 2010). Since the early 2000s, all three of these activities have continued apace. However, with a growing armamentarium of case law at our disposal, contemporary human rights scholarship is increasingly concerned with the actual impact that human rights advocacy and law have on the welfare of communities and individuals. This new direction in human rights research has led to a more sophisticated understanding of the nature and scope of state obligations and responsibilities for the protection and promotion of all human rights, especially those enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants on Civil and Political, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.