The emergence of rich complex dynamics in a spatial dyadic game with resource storage, participation cost, and agent interaction propensity

Abstract

We present an evolutionary game model combining subordinate elements from several viewpoints to address whether a resource-storing mechanism promotes a society where the wealthy engage in or refrain from conflict. The model is based on the pairwise game, which incorporates the accumulation of payoffs over time and introduces the concept of participation probability based on wealthiness. Our study encompasses four distinct game classes: Prisoner's Dilemma, Trivial, Stag Hunt, and Chicken. By incorporating these diverse social dilemma structures, we strive to comprehensively understand the dynamics within different game scenarios. Additionally, we broaden the scope of our analysis by considering two network types: a regular lattice network and a Barabasi-Albert scale-free (BA-SF) graph. Through simulation results, we have discovered that the commonly held belief or human philosophical wisdom that “the wealthy do not fight” leads to the emergence of a cooperative society, depending on the intensity of the dilemma. In contrast, our findings strongly suggest that the prevailing notion of “the wealthy do fight” fosters an imbalanced exploitation-based society where defectors who exploit the poor cooperators thrive. Further analysis shows variations in beliefs and dynamics between cooperators and defectors, highlighting the emergence of social dilemmas and the impact of payoff storage. Our result reported here proves that the proposed model based on a minimal spatial game setting by 2-player & 2-strategy game just added several subordinate components can reproduce rich, complex scenarios likely observed in a real human society.