The Emergence of ‘Conflictual Cooperation’ Amongst Parliaments in the Economic and Monetary Union

Abstract

The paper analyses the relationship amongst national parliaments (NPs) and between them and the European Parliament (EP) in the field of economic and monetary governance. In doing so it uses the principle of sincere and Chantal Mouffe’s account on conflictual consensus to elaborate a conceptual framework for the interparliamentary relationship in this particular policy area. The paper argues that the relationship between the EP and NPs in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is affected by the nature of the competence at stake, the mode and structure of decision-making and by the saliency of the policy. While in the field of monetary policy NPs and the EP tend to act independently of one another, in the economic governance conflictual cooperation among parliaments is emerging on the organization and functioning of interparliamentary relationships rather than on substantive policy options. Despite the confrontational dynamic often underlying the relationship between the EP and NPs as well as the relationships amongst NPs, the value of the vertical (and horizontal) interparliamentary is not put into question by the same institutional actors. This conflictual cooperation is inherent and probably inevitable in EU interparliamentary relationships and its impact can be assessed on the grounds of the ability of interparliamentary to nonetheless redress the information asymmetries parliaments are facing in the EMU with a view to positively impacting on the individual and collective ability of legislatures to scrutinize the EU fragmented executive.