Abstract

This chapter underlines the ethical and practical challenges that arise from post-conflict peacebuilding design. It provides empirical evidence that shows how payments intended initially as transitional support to ex-insurgents have continued indefinitely. Consequently, the beneficiaries now see these monetary rewards as an entitlement, which if terminated, serves as a predictor of future instability. This chapter argues that the mobilization of monetary incentives to buy peace from insurgents presents a strategic danger because it enthrones a peace economy in the oil region, which has rendered prospects towards positive peacebuilding counterproductive. Based on this argument, this chapter concludes that the failure of post-conflict peacebuilding stems directly from the nature of interventions pursued by the peacebuilders.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call