The emergence of a core–periphery structure in evolving multilayer network

Abstract

The application of the evolutionary game method to studying dynamics on multilayer networks is a current hot issue. However, most current evolutionary game models do not consider some constraints affecting the development of the relationship structure in a multilayer network. Therefore, this paper proposes a new model to explain the emergence and evolution of core and periphery structures in a multilayer network. Our model includes the direct costs of maintaining interactions between players in the game model. We also introduce the ability to end disadvantageous interactions (a defective neighbor that does not bring benefits is disconnected). Third, when establishing new relationships, a player establishes a relationship with another based on the estimate (trust) that this player will cooperate. The simulation results show that a core of densely connected cooperative players gradually emerges, isolating defectors on the periphery and gaining additional advantages. The proposed model contributes to understanding the emergence and development of the core–periphery structure in a multilayered network with a core formed either between players in the same layers or between players from other layers (across layers).