The Embodied Self and the Paradox of Subjectivity

Christoph Durt

doi:10.1007/s10743-019-09256-4

Abstract

While it seems obvious that the embodied self is both a subject of experience and an object in the world, it is not clear how, or even whether, both of these senses of self can refer to the same self. According to Husserl, the relation between these two senses of self is beset by the “paradox of human subjectivity.” Following Husserl’s lead, scholars have attempted to resolve the paradox of subjectivity. This paper categorizes the different formulations of the paradox according to the dimension each pertains to and considers the prospects of each proposed resolution. It will be shown that, contrary to the claims of the respective authors, their attempted resolutions do not really resolve the paradox, but instead rephrase it or push it to the next dimension. This suggests that there is something deeper at work than a mere misunderstanding. This paper does not aim to resolve the paradox but instead initiates a new approach to it. Instead of seeing the paradox as a misapprehension that needs to be removed, I dig deeper to reveal its roots in ordinary consciousness. Investigating the proposed resolutions will reveal the fundamental role of the natural attitude, and I will argue that already the general thesis of the natural attitude makes the decisive cut that leads to what Sartre calls a “fissure” in pre-reflective self-awareness. The phenomenological reduction deepens the cut into what Husserl calls the “split of the self,” which in turn engenders the paradox of subjectivity. The paradox’s roots in the structure of ordinary consciousness not only constitute a reason for its persistence, but also suggest a new way to further investigate the embodied self.

Highlights

The embodied self is, at the same time, subjectively aware of the world, and objectively part of the world as a human, animal, or other being
In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl contends that the concept of self engenders a paradox, the “paradox of human subjectivity: being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world” (1970, p. 178)
The epochē alone does not disclose the self as a subject for the world, but opens the way for the phenomenological reduction, which, as suggested by its Latin root, leads the experience of the natural attitude back to its constituents

Summary

Introduction

The embodied self is, at the same time, subjectively aware of the world, and objectively part of the world as a human, animal, or other being. This resolution is supposed to eliminate the paradox from the dimension of universal intersubjectivity Reflecting critically on his earlier work, Husserl admits that, in his investigation of the intersubjective constitution of the world, he had failed to pay sufficient attention to the self. The radical difference between the transcendental self and the empirical self, rather than resolving the paradox, can instead be used to reformulate it: The empirical self stands in a relationship of inclusion to the world—a partwhole relation—whereas the transcendental self is not in the world at all in the sense that the empirical self is; the transcendental self is of or for the world, a subject intentionally related to its object. As will be discussed some interpreters have claimed that the paradox is correctly interpreted as pertaining to this ontic dimension, and that it can be resolved on this construal

Ontic Interpretations of the Paradox

The Roots of the Paradox in Ordinary Consciousness

Conclusion