The electric vehicle promotion in the cold-chain logistics under two-sided support policy: An evolutionary game perspective

Abstract

Many countries, industries, companies and end consumers have actively switched from fuel cars to electric vehicles (EV) to combat global warming via emission control. However, given cost and research and development uncertainties, refrigerated truck manufacturers (RTMs) and cold-chain logistics enterprises (CCLEs) are hesitant to update and employ electric refrigerated trucks (ERTs). Government support, notably subsidies, is vital in the ERT promotion. Thus, this study investigates the optimal two-sided support policies of the government (i.e. subsidies for CCLEs and RTMs) to explore how it achieves the best incentive for ERT promotion in the cold-chain logistics with limited resources. The study develops an evolutionary game model to analyse the influence of multiple factors on ERT upgrade and penetration strategies, clarify dynamic subsidy policy adjustment measures based on industrial evolution under multiple-factor interactions, and discuss the dynamic adjustment priority of the two-sided subsidy policies. The results indicate that the two-sided hierarchical subsidy policy can improve the promotion of ERTs and stimulate the electrification development of the cold-chain transportation industry. Finally, the decision-making preferences of RTMs and CCLEs in multiple scenarios are discussed and feasible management suggestions for government and enterprises are proposed accordingly.