The electoral effects of closing military bases

Abstract

ABSTRACT Can members of Congress escape blame for bad news in their districts? To maximise their chances of re-election, legislators seek to maintain their electoral connections with voters, defending key district interests. Could actions by successive presidential administrations over the past three decades to close obsolete military bases have undermined such efforts? Although Congress and the president have deployed Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commissions to facilitate such closures and insulate individual members of Congress from directly traceable costs of those decisions, the electoral implications of base closures have yet to be fully probed. Focusing on the House of Representatives, I examine all major BRAC closings, and find that major base closures do not affect the electoral fortunes of incumbents. Rather, voters predominantly and typically punish the president’s party and first-term lawmakers during these elections. I conclude that Congressional fears about the electoral costs of base closings are likely unfounded.