The efforts of the Truman administration to resolve the Arab‐Israeli conflict

Abstract

A basic and virtually unquestioned assumption of the Truman administration was that economic aid could induce desired political results. The Marshall Plan stands out in this respect, but the favourable combination of enlighted self-interest and positive recipient motivation was not always to be found. In the Middle East, where the problem was to initiate economic development (unlike the European problem of recovery from war and financial dislocation), the political difficulties were unyielding and frustrating. Nevertheless the administration went to considerable lengths to prepare economic inducements which would be sufficiently attractive to create 'conditions favorable for a settlement'.' This approach was the hallmark of the New Deal inheritance, and was based on an optimistic view of society typical of the Democratic Party. As a tactic for dealing with Middle East conflicts, it provided a basis for a shrewd disengagement from political stalemate. The Truman administration realized nonetheless that a prime ingredient was necessary some willingness on the part of the recipients to accept responsibility for the refugee situation created by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Responsible and cooperative attitudes, however, were submerged beneath strong political emotions. The Saudi monarch Ibn Saud was paranoid in his fear of being surrounded by Hashemite enemies on the thrones of Iraq and Jordan. Egypt was profoundly suspicious of the British connections of the Hashemites, and of Abdullah's 'Greater Syria' ambitions which included the desire to annex Central Palestine. At the same time, the Iraq-Jordan rift intensified with the agitation for the unity of Iraq and Syria. Cutting across the rivalries and opposing ideological movements of the Arab world was a view of the new Jewish state as an alien intrusion rather than as a gallant testimony of creative survival. While in Israel itself, the fundamental commitment was to unlimited Jewish immigration despite its threat to blot out the country's prospects of economic viability. The Truman administration tried to convince the Arabs of American friendship, while at the same time working for a solution of the conflict. But sectarian misunderstanding was inherent in the situation. American support for Israel's application for membership of the United Nations, which was approved in May 1949, was resented. For its part, Israel accused the State Department of pro-Arab bias and saw its chief support in the White House. In turn, the executive denied that policy was determined on two different levels,2 and strove for a coherent and balanced approach. In response to misunderstandings about its intentions, and to maintain policy cohesiveness across a range of distant outposts, the State Department convened a meeting of Chiefs of Mission in the Near East at the end of