The Efficiency and Demands of the Italian Justice System

Abstract

A well-functioning judicial system is necessary for enforcing contracts and guaranteeing security of property rights. In fact, a good judicial system could reduce transaction costs and limit opportunistic behaviour, thus promoting growth through increasing specialization and innovation, developing financial and credit markets and promoting competition. What, then, are the causes of lengthy trials in Italy? We can identify at least four: free negotiation of lawyers’ fees; poor quality regulation; no implementation of ad hoc policy measures; host bureaucratic delays. It is well-known that pollution (recurrent changes in the rules and fragmented and slow courses of action) as well as considerable modifications in the law occur in Italy and this may consequently affect the demand for justice. As Gravelle (1990) states, “the demand for trials until the number of trials demanded by litigants is equal to the capacity of courts” (p. 255). The high level of Italian litigiousness could therefore derive from a disproportionate dimension and lack of transparency in the regulatory framework, the mutability of legal parameters, and the large number of lawyers, all of which submerge the courts. There are five actors who are interested in the duration of litigation, i.e. the two parties, their lawyers and the judge. Three of them have an interest in prolonging the process, one (the judge) is a neutral spectator, and the plaintiff is the only one who would gain from concluding the process in as short a time as possible. The quality of this service, which elsewhere is marked by the rapidity of court cases and procedures, is connected with the level of public resources necessary for managing this public service and the results obtained. In Italy the number of judges paid from public expenditure is in line with European levels. However, when compared to European systems, Italian justice is slower and less efficient.