Abstract
This paper examines the determination of effort levels, the rental price of quotas and the number of participants in a fishery managed with a total allowable catch and individual transferable quotas. How these variables change is determined for three phases of the management process. Potential participants in the fishery are assumed to be heterogeneous in their catching capabilities so that almost all active fishers earn positive net profits from fishing activities. It is shown that these quasirents are reduced during any of the management phases considered here. The impact of free allocations of permanent quota rights on fishers’ welfare is also considered. This may increase the welfare of all fishers if the allocation is based on catch history. However, an example is provided where the welfare of some highliners is reduced when the allocation is based on effort history.
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