Abstract

In an attempt to achieve greater transparency and disclosure, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) and the GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) implemented an information disclosure and transparency rankings system (IDTRS) for all listed companies in Taiwan. This study examines whether the implementation of IDTRS reduces earnings manipulation by firms and whether the manipulation practice changes after the ranking scheme was revised in 2005. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of information disclosure rankings on earnings manipulation in different ranking schemes and investigate the relationship between changes in disclosure rankings and changes in earnings management. The empirical results indicate that accruals-based earnings management and real activities manipulation can be effectively reduced by the ranking system and that the level of information disclosure in different ranking schemes is negatively related to earnings management. Comparing firms with a transparency ranking downgrade, we show that firms with a ranking upgrade tend to exhibit a significant decrease in their earnings management activities.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call