Abstract
Using a cutting-edge estimation method to address heterogenous treatment effects arising from differential treatment timing, we examine the effect of international takeover laws on corporate financing. We find that firms reduce their equity financing in response to takeover laws. Further analyses indicate that takeover laws’ negative effect on equity financing is more pronounced for firms with higher financial constraints and for firms in countries with strong investor protections.
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