Abstract
Group purchasing organizations gain increasing importance with respect to the supply of pharmaceutical products and frequently use multiple, exclusive or partially exclusive rebate contracts to exercise market power. Based on a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine the controversy around whether a superior rebate scheme exists, as far as consumer surplus, firms' profits and total welfare are concerned. We find that firms clearly prefer partially exclusive over multiple, and multiple over exclusive rebate contracts. In contrast, no rebate form exists that lowers total costs per se for the consumers or maximizes total welfare.
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