Abstract
Based on previous research on open innovation and appropriability strategies, using knowledge production functions and evolutionary game methods, this paper describes the process of dynamic cooperation between open innovation platforms and their participants. This paper specifically analyzes the influence of open innovation platform’s knowledge appropriability/knowledge sharing strategies, as well as participants’ exit/nonexit strategy, on the cooperative relationship. Through simulation analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the knowledge appropriability strategy of the open innovation platform and the participant’s nonexit strategy is an important strategic point of the cooperation between open innovation platforms and participants; second, the amount of knowledge production affects the strategic choices of open innovation platforms, while the knowledge increment affects the strategic choices of participants; third, the appreciation coefficient of complementary assets determines the direction of evolution of the cooperation process.
Highlights
Innovation profitability is affected by openness and sustainability [1,2,3]
The asymmetric evolutionary game model is used to study the relationship between the open innovation platform and the participants; second, the knowledge appropriability strategy is described under the open innovation platform strategies for the first time; third, the appreciation coefficient of complementary assets is used as a key variable of the knowledge production function
E conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows: (1) e strategic points of the appropriability/no exit combination formed in the evolutionary game have an important influence on the cooperative relationship between an open innovation platform and its participants. is enables the open innovation platform to retain participants and increases the knowledge-based profit of its operations, which is of great significance for said platform to inform its platform operation management and knowledge strategy selection in reality
Summary
An open innovation platform must have an effective cooperation mechanism that allows free entry, as well as deeper connections in various links based on knowledge, human resources, and other factors to maintain openness. E appropriability strategy may be formal or informal depending on the ownership of the intellectual property [4, 5]. E recent literature shows that research trends regarding open innovation have evolved toward the governance of open innovation platforms and productively. Holgersson et al [15] extended and nuanced the debate on intellectual property strategy, appropriation, and open innovation in dynamic and systemic innovation contexts. The process of weighing the pros and cons of open innovation and appropriability as two parallel strategies of enterprises has not been paid sufficient attention in the literature. The asymmetric evolutionary game model is used to study the relationship between the open innovation platform and the participants; second, the knowledge appropriability strategy is described under the open innovation platform strategies for the first time; third, the appreciation coefficient of complementary assets is used as a key variable of the knowledge production function
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