The effects of individual judgments about selection procedures: Results from a power-to-resist game

Abstract

We use a power-to-resist game to find out the effects of individuals’ judgments about a proposer's selection procedure on the willingness to offer resistance to proposed outcomes. In the experiment, one individual is selected based on a particular procedure. This individual is allowed to propose how to allocate a pie among five group members: herself and four responders. Then each responder in the group can decide whether to offer costly resistance to the proposed allocation. Resistance is modeled as a threshold public good. If the resistance is successful, the proposer receives nothing. If resistance is unsuccessful, the pie is distributed according to the proposer's decision. We find that resistance increases with (a) the size of the proposal, with (b) subjectively perceived unfairness of the selection procedure for the proposer's role, and with (c) the individual procedural preferences being unsatisfied. Surprisingly, resistance is not affected by whether the group's majority vote on the selection procedure is respected. We check for the robustness of our results and find that the results are stable over two countries. The presented evidence suggests that procedural effects over and above outcomes are relevant in strategic interaction.