The Effects of Group Benefits and Type of Distribution Rule on Noncompliance to Legitimate Authority

Abstract

Norms specifying the allocation of resources have been termed rules. This study investigates factors affecting individuals' noncompliance to sanctioned by a legitimate authority. We predict such noncompliance will be more likely when there is group consensus running counter to the legitimate authority rule atid the group consensus rule is more beneficial to persons and their groups than is the legitimate authority rule. Experimental tests indicate that although group benefit is an important factor in accounting for people's noncompliance, the type of rule is also important. Among sanctioned by legitimate authority, noncompliance to equality is more likely than noncompliance to equity rules. Norms specifying the allocation of resources have been termed distribution rules (Cook). These determine how material goods, rights, privileges, prestige, and power are distributed among individuals and groups in social systems. Two theoretical formulations, exchange and status value, have dealt with the relation between and distributive justice or equity problems. Exchange formulations are concerned with the process by which people assess the actual inputs and outcomes associated with various and make judgments of fairness (cf. Adams; Homans; Walster et al.). Status value formulations, on the other hand, are concerned with the social conditions that activate various which then determine individuals' judgments of fairness (Berger et al.). (See Cook and Parcel for an extensive discussion of