The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries

Abstract

This article develops a comparative institutionalist framework to investigate how pro-enforcement reforms leading to a change in competition policy regimes attracts FDI in host countries, and how this relationship is moderated by the interplay between key formal and informal institutions. We revisit the FDI theory by integrating insights from economics of competition policy and the most recent debate on how institutions matter to international business. We contend that the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement is a crucial factor in attracting FDI, but only in host countries characterized by institutional configurations where the lack of trust is concomitant with a high-quality regulatory institutional environment. Our analysis on a sample of 63 countries followed in the 1980–2017 period supports our hypotheses. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding on the competition policy–FDI relationship at national level and has implications for policy makers.