Abstract
Mega construction project governance is an evolutionary process characterized by high transaction costs and complex interrelationships. Based on transaction cost theory, relational contract theory and evolutionary governance theory, this study explored the impact of evolutionary project governance on mega construction project performance by collectively considering the mediating effect of transaction costs and the moderating effect of a relational contract. Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 176 respondents. The results show that evolutionary project governance would be more effective in increasing project performance and reducing transaction costs in the context of a relational contract. Reducing transaction costs is an effective way to improve project performance, and it is an important mediation variable between evolutionary project governance and project performance in the context of a relational contract. The results enrich the theory on mega construction project governance and reduce the imbalance between theory and practice in previous studies.
Highlights
A mega construction project (MCP) is a dynamic system comprising a large number of stakeholders, including individuals and organizations, and interdependencies among these stakeholders (Jaafari, 2001)
Prior research in the field of construction project governance has paid limited attention to the evolutionary governance of MCPs, especially under the collective consideration of transaction costs and relational contracts. This study filled this gap by examining the effects of evolutionary project governance on MCP performance, and studying the mediating role of transaction costs and the moderating role of relational contracts
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on MCP governance by enhancing the understanding of how evolutionary project governance (EPG) affects MCP performance
Summary
A mega construction project (MCP) is a dynamic system comprising a large number of stakeholders, including individuals and organizations, and interdependencies among these stakeholders (Jaafari, 2001). The first considers that performance problems are caused by stakeholders’ opportunism (Chang, 2013; Di Maddaloni & Davis, 2018; Xue et al, 2016). Li, Lu, Ma, and Kwak (2018) state that the majority of these studies ignore the highly dynamic environment of MCPs. Static governance frameworks cannot adapt to the changing environment and be applied to solve practical problems effectively. The participant organizations of a collaborative project improve their governance by developing a contract system and changing the leadership structure continuously (Hartmann, Davies, & Frederiksen, 2010; Love, Ackermann, Teo, & Morrison, 2015)
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